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We study preferences over procedures in the presence of naive agents. We employ a
school choice setting following Pathak and So¨nmez (2008) who show that sophisticated
agents are better o↵ under the Boston mechanism than under a strategy-proof mechanism
if some agents are sincere. We use lab experiments to study the preferences of subjects
for the Boston mechanism or the assortative matching. We compare the preferences of
stakeholders who know their own role with agents behind the veil of ignorance and spec-
tators. As predicted, stakeholders vote for the Boston mechanism if it maximizes their
payo↵s and vote for the asssortative matching otherwise. This is in line with the model
of Pathak and So¨nmez (2008). Subjects behind the veil of ignorance mainly choose the
Boston mechanism when the priority at schools is determined randomly. In a second
experiment with priorities based on performance in a real-e↵ort task, spectators whose
payo↵ does not depend on the choice of the mechanism are split in their vote for the Boston
mechanism and the assortative matching. According to the spectators’ statements in the
post-experimental questionnaire, the main reason for preferring the Boston mechanism
is that playing the game well deserves a higher payo↵. These findings provide a novel
explanation for the widespread use of the Boston mechanism.
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1 Introduction
Mechanisms or procedures to solve allocation problems are used in many domains of life.
Examples are central clearinghouses for seats at schools or universities, procedures for the
allocation of public housing, and online booking systems for appointments. The complexity
of such procedures di↵ers widely, and can a↵ect their public acceptability.1 We focus on
procedures that di↵er with respect to how di cult it is to make an optimal choice. If mistakes
are more often made by people with less information or less education, this can raise issues of
equity and fairness. In this paper, we study how people evaluate procedures that di↵er with
respect to the possibility of reaching a better outcome by making strategic choices.
To study preferences over procedures, we build on a debate in the school choice literature
regarding the Boston and the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism (Abdulkadirog˘lu and
So¨nmez, 2003; Gale and Shapley, 1962; Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2011; Featherstone and Niederle,
2016). While the DA mechanism is strategy-proof, i.e., the best strategy is to report the
true preferences over schools, the Boston mechanism often makes it optimal to manipulate
the preference list. Pathak and So¨nmez (2008) show that in theory the Boston mechanism
benefits sophisticated students who act strategically at the expense of sincere students who
always submit their true preferences. In other words, sophisticated parents can reach better
outcomes under the Boston mechanism in the presence of sincere parents than under DA.
Apart from this argument, we know very little about people’s preferences over mecha-
nisms.2 In this paper, we study whether people prefer a mechanism such as DA that yields
the stable assortative matching or the Boston mechanism. We design an experimental school
choice problem where students have fully correlated preferences over schools and vice versa,
and where there are enough seats for all students. Some students in a market are sincere as
they are forced to submit their true preference ranking. The remaining students are free to
submit any preference ranking, i.e., they can be strategic. In the Nash equilibrium of the
Boston mechanism, the two sincere students are matched to the two lowest-ranked schools.
This benefits all students that have a lower priority and who thereby receive better seats. In
constrast, in the stable assortative matching (and the Nash equilibrium in DA), the two sincere
students are matched to the schools of their rank. Note the for simplicity, we implemented
the assortative matching directly, without relying on preference reports.
We elicit preferences over the two mechanisms by letting subjects vote on which mecha-
nism should be implemented. We consider three di↵erent types of voters: subjects in the role
of stakeholders, i.e., voters who know their rank when making their voting decision, subjects
1For example, the criticism of the French centralized procedure for university admissions, Parcoursup,
focused on its intransparency and complexity, among other issues. See https://www.lepoint.fr/education/
parcoursup-2e-version-en-progres-16-05-2019-2313092_3584.php.
2One exception is Schmelzer (2016) who compares preferences regarding single and multiple tie-breaking
in school choice.
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behind a veil of ignorance, i.e., subjects who do not know their rank when voting, and spec-
tators, i.e., subjects who vote for a mechanism that will be implemented for another group of
subjects.3
We hypothesize that stakeholders tend to vote for the mechanism that yields the higher
payo↵ for them, following Pathak and So¨nmez (2008). Thus, participants who can choose
their preference list freely are predicted to vote for the Boston mechanism while those who
have to submit their true preferences vote for the assortative matching. Some participants
may have procedural preferences that deflect their choices away from the selfish prediction.
However, the precise direction of such deviations is hard to predict: On the one hand, people
may dislike the strategic environment of the Boston mechanism since previous research has
shown that people have a preference for truth-telling (Abeler et al., 2019). On the other hand,
they may prefer the ability to make choices in the Boston mechanism, e.g., because they are
overconfident and believe that they understand the mechanism better than others.
Regarding the spectators, we hypothesize that fairness concerns play a role for their choice.
Since the rank of subjects matched to schools is determined by their performance in a real-
e↵ort task performed in the lab, spectators may have meritocratic reasons for preferring the
stable assortative matching that gives higher payo↵s to subjects who performed better in the
task.
The veil of ignorance constitutes an intermediate situation. Given that the distribution
of payo↵s is fixed across mechanisms and given that subjects do not know their rank behind
the veil of ignorance, the main di↵erence between the Boston mechanism and the assortative
matching is which payo↵s are allocated to participants at di↵erent ranks. Thus, we hold
constant outcome-based fairness in equilibrium but vary the source of inequality in the payo↵s.
We therefore expect subjects behind the veil of ignorance to vote for the assortative matching
if they place some value on the ranks or abstain.
We find that the voting of stakeholders is in line with the predictions of Pathak and So¨nmez
(2008): those stakeholders who can choose freely tend to vote for the Boston mechanism. By
contrast, those who have to submit their true preferences tend to vote for the assortative
outcome. Thus, the preferences of stakeholders for the Boston mechanism are in line with
their monetary incentives. More surprisingly, the majority of subjects behind the veil of
ignorance also vote for the Boston mechanism instead of the assortative matching.
For the spectators, we find that a majority of them prefers the Boston mechanism, and
only a small fraction abstains. In the experiments, we varied the performance rank of the
students who are forced to submit their true preferences. We observe that the spectators react
to this information. There is suggestive evidence that more spectators vote for the Boston
3Previous experiments have employed the veil of ignorance (e.g. Schildberg-Ho¨risch, 2010) and spectator
designs (e.g. Konow, 2000; Cappelen et al., 2013; Mollerstrom et al., 2015) to study preferences for redistribu-
tion. To our knowledge, we are the first to employ these designs for the choice of mechanisms.
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mechanism when those who are forced to be sincere are the lower-performing students. Thus,
the perceived fairness of the allocation procedure seems to matter for spectators’ choices.
Another aspect of fairness emerges from the free-form answers in the post-experimental ques-
tionnaire according to which many subjects consider the outcome of a strategic game such as
the Boston mechanism as fair.
The experiment contributes to a small, but growing literature on behavioral e↵ects in
matching markets.4 Pathak and So¨nmez (2008) show that sophisticated players have an
incentive to support a non-strategy-proof matching algorithm, since this allows them to exploit
naive players who do not act strategically. Our paper can be seen as the first empirical
test of this idea: imposing the existence of non-strategic players in a controlled laboratory
environment, we find evidence that the remaining players understand the incentives of the
Boston mechanism to game the system, and prefer this system over a matching system that
directly implements the assortative matching outcome. Basteck and Mantovani (2018) show
with the help of experiments that payo↵ di↵erences between high and low- cognitive-ability
participants are smaller under DA than under Boston, and that DA is more e↵ective in
preventing low-ability individuals from ending up at the worst schools. In contrast, we let
stakeholders and spectators vote over mechanisms—a feature that is absent in Basteck and
Mantovani (2018). Moreover, we impose sincere preference reports by some subjects instead
of measuring cognitive ability.
The paper builds on a recent literature in experimental economics which uses a spectator
approach to study voting behavior in isolation of any self-interest and personal involvement
(see, e.g. Konow, 2000; Cappelen et al., 2013; Mollerstrom et al., 2015). In these studies,
individuals vote over di↵erent income allocations in order to address questions of distributional
justice. In contrast, income distributions are held constant in our paper. Instead, we let
individuals decide over the mechanisms governing how subjects are assigned the various school
seats or monetary payo↵s. We thus contribute to a better understanding of preferences about
procedural justice. For such preferences over procedures, notions of transparency, impartiality,
and equality of opportunity are well established. However, our results reveal that many
individuals value mechanisms that leave room for clever behavior. To our knowledge, a
preference for the possibility to make strategic choices has not been identified so far.
Our paper goes beyond Pathak and So¨nmez (2008) by varying the source of priorities at
schools and the degree to which decision makers are involved in the school choice procedure.
First, we show that the preference of sophisticated players for the Boston mechanism survives
in contexts where ranks are merit based, that is, earned in a competitive environment—
which is not considered explicitly in the theoretical framework of Pathak and So¨nmez (2008).
Second, we test whether behavioral factors shape the preferences for matching mechanisms.
We demonstrate that overconfidence regarding the ability to game the system cannot explain
4For a survey of matching experiments see Hakimov and Ku¨bler (2019).
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our results. We identify a direct preference for matching mechanisms, largely unnoticed so
far: A considerable share of individuals vote for the Boston mechanism, since they consider
the outcome of a strategic game as fair. This observation appears to be robust, since it also
emerges when we completely switch o↵ any personal stakes in the mechanisms: Impartial
spectators want others to play the Boston mechanism because they consider strategic choices
as a source of entitlement.
The finding that many participants prefer the strategic environment adds a new twist to
explaining the widespread use of the Boston mechanism in spite of its problematic properties.
Pathak and So¨nmez (2008) argue that sophisticated players may form political coalitions
(e.g, parent clubs) to lobby for the Boston mechanism. However, for this argument to work,
sophisticated players need to find a political majority to enforce their interests, which is
questionable if naive players learn that they tend to lose in the Boston mechanism. Our
experiments demonstrate that individuals not directly a↵ected by the matching market tend
to support the Boston mechanism for reasons of fairness, making majorities in favor of it more
likely.
We acknowledge that questions of external validity arise. In particular, we can only
speculate about the preference for non-strategy-proof mechanisms with high-stake outcomes
outside of the lab. However, our findings suggest that the strength of the preference for non-
strategy-proof mechanisms interacts with performance-based entitlements: We observe less
voting for the Boston mechanism the more it hurts individuals on higher performance ranks.
Therefore, we would predict the preference for manipulable mechanisms to be more relevant
in settings where matching priorities are less tied to merit, for example when priorities at
schools are not based on ability. In such instances, strategic play can serve as a substitute
for ability in the fairness perceptions.
In the next section, we introduce some basic concepts from the theory of matching. We
conducted two experiments, Experiment 1 and 2, that are presented in Section 3. Section 4
concludes.
2 Matching markets: basic concepts
In this section, we introduce concepts of matching theory that will be used to characterize
the experimental school choice problem. A matching is called stable if two conditions are
satisfied: First, every agent prefers the assigned matching partner to remaining unmatched,
i.e., the student is matched to a school that she prefers to being unmatched, and the school is
only matched to acceptable students. Second, there is no school-student pair such that each
prefers one another to their respective match. Thus, in a stable matching no student and
school have an incentive to contract around the clearinghouse and form a di↵erent match.
The concept of stability can be interpreted as a notion of fairness, namely that no student
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experiences justified envy towards another student: it cannot be the case that a student
prefers the school of another student and has a higher priority at that school.
In our setup, all students rank schools in the same way, i.e., they agree on the best school,
the second-best school, etc. At the same time, all schools rank students based on their
performance rank. Thus, there exists an assortative matching outcome. A matching outcome
is assortative if the highest-ranked students are matched to the most-preferred school, the
next highest-ranked students are matched to the second most-preferred school and so on.
The incentives of students to submit their rankings of schools are an important property
of matching mechanisms. Moreover, it matters how complicated it is for agents to submit
a ranking that is optimal. Strategy-proofness means that truthful preference revelation is a
(weakly) dominant strategy for agents. If a mechanism is strategy-proof for the students, they
cannot gain from misreporting their preferences, independent of the choices of other students.
Our experiments employ the Boston mechanism which works as follows:
Step 1: Each student applies to the school that she ranks first. Each school admits accept-
able students up to its capacity, in the order of the performance ranks. These assignments
are final. The remaining students are rejected.
Step k, k 2: Each student who was rejected in the previous step applies to the most-
preferred acceptable school among the schools to which the student has not yet applied. Each
school admits acceptable students up to its remaining capacity, according to their performance
ranks. These assignments are final. The remaining students are rejected.
The algorithm terminates when no student is rejected, or all schools have filled the seats
up to their capacity. All remaining students are unassigned.
The Boston mechanism is not strategy-proof for the students. For example, it is straight-
forward to see that it can be optimal for a student to skip her most preferred school if she has
no chance of being admitted. If students tell the truth, unstable outcomes can occur where
a student prefers a seat at a school where she has a higher priority than a student who was
admitted. In Nash equilibrium, the outcome of the Boston mechanism is stable (Ergin and
So¨nmez, 2006). However, the equilibrium requires strategic play by the students. On the
other hand, if all students report their preferences truthfully, the Boston mechanism leads to
a Pareto e cient and potentially unstable allocation.
3 Experiments
The experiments are designed to study preferences over mechanisms. We employ stylized
markets in order to make it transparent that sincere subjects are harmed by the Boston
mechanism if other players act strategically. The alternative to the Boston mechanism is the
assortative matching that is implemented directly, without preference reports, for the sake of
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simplicity.5 In our matching problem, the sophisticated players earn higher payo↵s under the
Boston mechanism than in the assortative matching while the opposite holds for the sincere
players if the equilibrium is played in the Boston mechanism. By contrast, if all subjects
report their preferences truthfully in the Boston mechanism, both mechanisms lead to the
same allocation of payo↵s. We also investigate the preferences of subjects behind the veil of
ignorance in order to capture their ex ante preferences. Finally, we let spectators decide on
one of the two mechanisms that is then applied in an experimental session.
3.1 Experiment 1
The first experiment studies the choices of stakeholders who know their rank and of stake-
holders behind the veil of ignorance.
3.1.1 Design of Experiment 1
Priorities of students At the beginning of the treatment, the students are randomly
assigned their rank. These ranks determine the priority of students at schools where a better
rank means a higher priority (rank 1 is best etc.). Students are informed about their rank.
Matching market We implement the simplest possible market where strategic applicants
can benefit from sincere applicants in the Boston mechanism. Although the setup is stylized,
this allows us to study preferences over mechanisms in a transparent setup. The experimental
matching problem consists of eight students and five schools. Schools A and B have one seat
each while schools C, D, and E have two seats each. Students have fully correlated preferences
over schools. The priority of students at schools is determined by their rank, and is therefore
also perfectly correlated. Students participate in a school admissions game. A participant
earns 12 Euro if she receives a seat at school A, 10 Euro at school B, 8 Euro at school C, 6
Euro at school D, and 4 Euro at school E. The assignment of students to schools is either
based on the Boston mechanism, or the stable assortative matching is implemented. The
assortative matching implies that the student of rank 1 is admitted by school A, the student
of rank 2 is admitted by school B etc.:
(1) ((1, A), (2, B), (3, C), (4, C), (5, D), (6, D), (7, E), (8, E)).
Nash equilibrium There is a unique Nash equilibrium outcome of the game induced by
the Boston mechanism if all eight students can submit their preference lists strategically. This
equilibrium outcome is the assortative matching. To see this, assume that students who know
5Alternatively, we could have implemented a serial dictatorship mechanism which yields the assortative
matching outcome in our market.
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their rank list the school first that they would be matched to in the assortative matching.
This is an equilibrium since no profitable deviation exists.6 However, if students 2 and 3 are
forced to submit their preferences truthfully, student 4 can get into school B by listing it first,
student 5 can get into school C by listing it first etc. such that students 2 and 3 end up at
the least attractive school E.7
The resulting matching is
(2) ((1, A), (2, E), (3, E), (4, B), (5, C), (6, C), (7, D), (8, D)).
Analogous equilibrium outcomes result if students 3 and 4 or 4 and 5 are sincere where all
students with ranks below the sincere students move up to a better school while the sincere
students are admitted to school E.
Mechanisms First, the Boston mechanism is introduced and explained. The students in
ranks 2 and 3 cannot choose freely, but are forced to submit their true preferences. We decided
to impose sincerity for students on ranks 2 and 3 in order to generate a predicted di↵erence in
outcomes between the two mechanisms for as many subjects as possible. Only for the student
in rank 1 the equilibrium outcome in the Boston mechanism is equivalent to her assortative
matching outcome. The students are informed that students in ranks 2 and 3 have to submit
their true rank-order list. Then, the students can explore the Boston mechanism with the
help of an on-screen tool that lets them simulate the outcomes for di↵erent rank-order lists.
After this trial phase, they complete a quiz to make sure they have understood the Boston
mechanism. Finally, they are asked to submit rank-order lists of the schools. Besides their
own rank-order lists, we also elicit their beliefs about the first choice of other students. If the
expectations about all other students’ first choices are correct, they earn 2 Euros.
Afterwards, the assortative matching is displayed (student of rank 1 receives a seat at
school A etc.). In the stable assortative matching, the two sincere students are matched to
the schools according to their rank. However, under the Boston mechanism they are matched
to the lowest-ranked school E if all other students play the equilibrium strategy. Thus, the
two sincere students earn higher payo↵s in the assortative matching than in the outcome
reached under the Boston mechanism. On the other hand, the students who can report their
preferences freely either earn the same payo↵ as in the Boston mechanism (those with a higher
priority than the sincere students), or are better o↵ in the Boston mechanism (those with a
worse priority than the sincere students).
6Note that there are multiple equilibrium strategies since the ranking of schools after the first do not
matter. Moreover, students 7 and 8 can submit any ranking as long as school E is on their list.
7Students 7 and 8 can submit any list as long as school D is on the first, second, or third position of their
rank-order list.
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Figure 1: Timeline of Experiment 1
Voting Finally, students vote on which outcome to implement: the outcome implied by the
game under the Boston mechanism that they just participated in, or the assortative matching.
The voting outcome is determined by the random-dictator rule. Subjects are informed which
mechanism is chosen to determine the payo↵s.
Treatments and hypotheses Figure 1 shows the timeline of Experiment 1. The only
di↵erence between the treatments concerns the time at which subjects receive information
about their rank and at which they submit their rank-order list. Treatment Stakeholder/VoI
di↵ers from Stakeholder/Random with regard to the order of steps: the announcements of
the subjects’ ranks, the elicitation of beliefs regarding other subjects’ first choices, and the
submission of preference lists occur after the voting stage. Hence, in Stakeholder/VoI the
subjects vote behind a veil of ignorance.
We formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Subjects in Stakeholder/Random vote for the mechanism that yields a
higher payo↵ for them. Thus, sincere subjects vote for the assortative matching while subjects
at ranks 4 to 8 vote for the Boston mechanism.
Note that behind the veil of ignorance, both mechanisms have the same distribution of
payo↵s ex ante, since ranks are determined randomly. However, we hypothesize that subjects
either abstain from costly voting or prefer the assortative matching that honors the priorities
of students at the schools.
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Notes: The figure shows the vote share for the respective procedure. In treatment Stakeholder/Random
we divide the sample into ranks above sincere (n=12), sincere (n=24), and below sincere (n=60), and for
Stakeholder/VoI we show the full sample (n=48).
Hypothesis 2: Subjects behind the veil of ignorance vote for the assortative matching or
abstain from voting.
Overall, 96 subjects participated in the Stakeholder/Random treatment and 48 subjects
in the Stakeholder/VoI treatment.8 Subjects received 5 Euro show-up fee. Voting costs were
10 cents. Subjects earned on average 12.28 Euro with the sessions lasting on average 60
minutes.
3.1.2 Results of Experiment 1: Voting
In Figure 2, we show the vote shares in both the Stakeholder/Random and the Stake-
holder/VoI treatment. Since in Stakeholder/Random the incentives to vote depend on the
rank, we show the vote shares separately for subjects who have to submit their true preference
lists (sincere), and for subjects who are on the ranks above and below the sincere students.
In Stakeholder/Random we observe that subjects vote in line with their self-interest. The
majority of subjects in the first rank who are indi↵erent (“above sincere”) abstain from vot-
ing and do not pay the voting costs. The majority of sincere students who benefit from the
assortative matching in equilibrium, vote for the assortative matching. Moreover, the major-
8Table A.1 in the appendix presents some descriptive statistics of the sample.
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Table 1: Vote shares in Stakeholder/VoI and Stakeholder/Random
Vote share H0: Vote shares equal to
Treatment Boston Assortative Abstention VoI Above sincere Sincere
Stakeholder/VoI
Total 45.8% 12.5% 41.7%
Stakeholder/Random
Above Sincere 0.0% 16.7% 83.3% p=0.005
Sincere 4.2% 87.5% 8.3% p=0.000 p=0.000
Below Sincere 80.0% 5.0% 15.0% p=0.001 p=0.000 p=0.000
Notes: This table shows the fraction of subjects who vote for the Boston mechanism, the assortative matching,
or abstain. For the Involved/Random Treatment, we show separate vote shares for sincere students and
students whose ranks are above or below the sincere students. In the right panel, we show results from
hypothesis tests that compare the vote shares between the groups using Fisher’s exact tests.
ity of subjects who benefit from the Boston mechanism because they have ranks below the
sincere students (“below sincere”), vote for the Boston mechanism. The Fisher’s exact tests
in Table 1 confirm that the vote shares between the three groups are significantly di↵erent
from each other. Thus, the findings support Hypothesis 1:
Result 1: A large majority of subjects in Stakeholder/Random vote for the mechanism
with the higher individual payo↵. Thus, most sincere subjects vote for the assortative match-
ing while most subjects at ranks 4 to 8 vote for the Boston mechanism.
In the treatment with a veil of ignorance (Stakeholder/VoI), we observe that 45.8% of
subjects (78.6% of voters) vote for the Boston mechanism while only 12.5% (22.4% of voters)
vote for the assortative matching. The remaining 41.7% of subjects abstain from voting. A
binomial test confirms that significantly more subjects vote for the Boston mechanism than
for the assortative matching (p=0.004). Moreover, the hypothesis tests in Table 1 show that
the distribution of votes in Stakeholder/VoI is significantly di↵erent from the three groups in
the Stakeholder/Random Treatment. Thus, in contrast to Hypothesis 2 we find:
Result 2: Behind the veil of ignorance, almost half of the subjects vote for the Boston
mechanism. A slightly smaller proportion abstains, and only 12.5% vote for the assortative
matching.
Hence, in Stakeholder/VoI we observe that 58.3% of subjects are willing to pay the vot-
ing cost to a↵ect which mechanism is implemented, and that the majority of voters prefer
the Boston mechanism. Note that behind the veil of ignorance the distribution of payo↵s
is exactly identical in the assortative matching and under the Boston mechanism. However,
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Table 2: Equilibrium choices in Stakeholder/Random and Stakeholder/VoI
Rank Stakeholder/Random Stakeholder/VoI Fisher’s exact test
Above Sincere (Rank 1) 12/12 (100.0%) 5/6 (83.3%) p=0.333
Below Sincere (Rank 4-6) 27/36 (75.0%) 12/18 (67.0%) p=0.536
Below Sincere (Rank 7-8) 21/24 (87.5%) 11/12 (91.7%) p=1.000
Total 60/96 (83.3%) 28/36 (77.8%) p=0.600
Notes: This table shows the fraction of subjects who play the equilibrium strategy in the Boston mechanism
by treatment. Best response means for students in rank 1 to list school A as first choice, for students in rank
4 to list school B first, for students in ranks 5 and 6 to put school C first, and for students in ranks 7 and 8
to list school C as first, second or third choice.
subjects may believe that they understand the Boston mechanism better than other partic-
ipants, therefore expecting higher payo↵s than in the assortative matching. To investigate
this argument further, we analyze how subjects actually play the Boston mechanism and their
beliefs regarding other subjects’ choices.
3.1.3 Results of Experiment 1: Preference lists and outcomes of Boston mech-
anism
Table 2 shows how many students choose the equilibrium strategy.9 We observe a large frac-
tion of subjects exhibiting equilibrium behavior: 83.3% in Stakeholder/Random and 77.8%
in Stakeholder/VoI with no significant di↵erences between the treatments. Among the sub-
jects with ranks below the sincere students, only one out of 60 in Stakeholder/Random and
two out of 30 subjects in Stakeholder/VoI reported their preferences truthfully. Hence, the
instructions and the trial phase were successful in explaining the game, and subjects do not
display a strong preference for truthtelling.
Next, we investigate the expectations about others’ behavior in the Boston mechanism.
If subjects believe that others make mistakes and do not play the equilibrium strategy, this
could potentially explain the high vote share for Boston behind the veil of ignorance. In
Table 3, we show the fraction of subjects who expect other students to list the first choice
predicted in equilibrium.10 The majority of subjects in both treatments expect other students
to submit first preferences that are in line with Nash equilibrium. We can also consider only
those subjects who play the equilibrium strategy themselves, thereby exhibiting that they
9Since students in ranks 2 and 3 are forced to submit their true preferences, it is the best response by the
subject in rank 1 to list A first, in rank 4 to list B first, in ranks 5 and 6 to list C first and in ranks 7 and 8
to list D at the first, second, or third position on the list.
10We have elicited expectations about the first choice of other students. For students on ranks 1 to 6 the
first choice determines equilibrium behavior, hence, we show these ranks in Table 3. To determine if subjects
on ranks 7 and 8 exhibit equilibrium behavior, we would also need expectations about their second and third
choice.
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Table 3: Expectations of other subjects’ equilibrium choices
Stakeholder/VoI
Rank Stakeholder/Random Total Own Best Response
Above Sincere (Rank 1) 75/84 (89.3%) 38/42 (90.5%) 22/23 (95.7%)
Below Sincere (Rank 4) 63/84 (75.0%) 32/42 (76.2%) 22/24 (91.7%)
Below Sincere (Rank 5) 58/84 (69.0%) 32/42 (76.2%) 22/25 (88.0%)
Below Sincere (Rank 6) 57/84 (67.9%) 32/42 (76.2%) 21/23 (91.3%)
Notes: This table shows the reported expectations about other subjects’ equilibrium behavior regarding their
first choice. This means for students in rank 1 to list school A first, for students in rank 4 to list school B
first, and for students in ranks 5 and 6 to put school C first. The last column is based on subjects in the Veil
of Ignorance treatment who play the equilibrium strategy themselves. Note that students 7 and 8 list school
D first, second, or third in equilibrium but we did not elicit beliefs about second or third choices.
understand the equilibrium. Among those subjects (“Own Equilibrium Strategy”) on average
about 87% expect others to choose the equilibrium strategy.
The elicited beliefs limit the scope for explaining the high vote share for Boston in the
Stakeholder/VoI treatment with the expectation that other students fail to play the equilib-
rium strategy. Instead, subjects could have a procedural preference for the Boston mechanism.
A possible reason is that the ranks in Experiment 1 are determined randomly, which does
not create strong entitlements, and that gaming the Boston mechanism is seen as meriting a
high payo↵. In order to investigate this possibility more thoroughly, we run Experiment 2.
3.2 Experiment 2
It is conceivable that the ranks of students in Experiment 1 that were determined randomly
are not perceived as justifying the higher payo↵s of higher-ranked students in the assortative
matching. This could explain why the Boston mechanism is chosen by the majority of stake-
holders behind the veil of ignorance. In Experiment 2, the students’ ranks are based on the
performance in a real-e↵ort task. Moreover, we randomly determined which pairs of students
are sincere, either 2 and 3, 3 and 4, or 4 and 5. This ensures that subjects have an incentive
to perform well in the real-e↵ort task, and provides some variation in the ranks of subjects
who are harmed by the Boston mechanism vis-a`-vis the assortative matching.
3.2.1 Design of Experiment 2
Priorities of students The rank is no longer determined randomly. Instead, the students
have to count zeros in matrices consisting of zeros and ones for 10 minutes in the first part
of the experiment. The task is based on Abeler et al. (2011), and a screenshot is provided
in Figure B.2 in the Appendix. During these 10 minutes, subjects are allowed to browse
the internet by clicking an on-screen button. This outside option was meant to make the
Figure 3: Timeline of Experiment 2
ranks even more informative and legitimate, since subjects had an attractive alternative to
working. Upon completion of the task, participants are informed of their performance rank
in the group.
Mechanisms and voting The Boston mechanism and the assortative matching are pre-
sented in counterbalanced order. After the Boston mechanism and the assortative matching
are explained, the subjects can vote for one of the two mechanisms. If the Boston mechanism
is selected with the random dictator rule, the subjects submit their preference lists for the
Boston mechanism.
Treatments and hypotheses As in Experiment 1, there are two treatments: Stake-
holder/E↵ort and Spectator. In Stakeholder/E↵ort, subjects vote on the mechanism that
will assign them to schools, similarly to subjects in Stakeholder/Random (Experiment 1).
Figure 3 shows the timeline of Experiment 2. After being introduced to the Boston mecha-
nism with the help of the simulation and the quiz, subjects are asked to vote for the Boston
mechanism or the assortative matching. Voting costs 0.05 Euro while subjects have to pay
nothing in case they abstain. As in Experiment 1, this small cost of voting prevents those
subjects from voting who are indi↵erent between the two options. The computer randomly
picks one of the subjects and implements her choice. If a subject is picked who abstained,
a random draw selects the procedure. If the Boston mechanism is selected, subjects in the
player session are asked to submit their preference lists for the Boston mechanism. Finally,
participants are informed about the result of the vote and their payo↵s.
For treatment Stakeholder/E↵ort we hypothesize as in Experiment 1:
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Hypothesis 3: Subjects in Stakeholder/E↵ort vote for the mechanism that gives them a
higher payo↵ in equilibrium. Thus, sincere subjects vote for the assortative matching while
subjects at ranks 4 to 8 vote for the Boston mechanism.
The Spectator treatment di↵ers from Stakeholder/E↵ort in that participants vote on the
mechanism that will assign other subjects to schools in a later session. These sessions are
called Player sessions. Thus, the voting outcome in the Spectator session a↵ects a group of
experimental subjects who do not vote themselves. For each group of eight spectators, we ran
a session of eight subjects. After the spectators made their decisions, we picked one of them
randomly to determine the allocation mechanism in the session that took place afterwards.
Thus, a spectator was pivotal with a probability of 18 , just as the applicants in the Stake-
holder/E↵ort treatment. Since the mechanism that is selected in the Spectator treatment is
not payo↵-relevant for the spectators, we interpret their decisions as reflecting fairness prefer-
ences. Since ranks are earned in a real-e↵ort task, merit-based fairness leads to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Spectators vote for the assortative matching or abstain from voting.
In total, there are 96 subjects each in the Stakeholder/E↵ort, Spectator, and Player ses-
sions.11 Participants received a show-up fee of 8.05 Euro in the Stakeholder/E↵ort treatment
and 10.05 Euro in the Spectator treatment. The experimental sessions of both treatments
lasted on average 60 minutes. Average earnings (including the show-up fee) were Euro 16.92
in the Stakeholder/E↵ort and 17.05 Euro in the Spectator treatments.
3.2.2 Results of Experiment 2: Voting
The share of votes for the Boston mechanism and the assortative matching are displayed in
Figure 4.as well as abstentions. Similar to Experiment 1, the stakeholders vote mainly for
the mechanism that yields the highest payo↵ for them. While almost 79.2% of those who are
forced to be sincere vote for the assortative matching, 89.6% of those who are on the lower
ranks than the sincere students vote for the Boston mechanism. In Experiment 2, only 29.2%
of students with better ranks than the sincere students (“above sincere”) abstain although
their payo↵s are the same under both mechanisms, 50.0% of them vote for the assortative
matching while 20.8% vote for the Boston mechanism.
Hypothesis tests suggest that the vote shares of “below sincere” students are significantly
di↵erent from the other two groups but that the vote shares of “sincere” and “above sincere”
are only marginally significantly di↵erent from each other. In sum, our findings support Hy-
11Table A.1 in the appendix presents descriptive statistics of the sample.
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Notes: The figure shows the vote share for the respective procedure. In Stakeholder/E↵ort we divide the
sample into ranks above sincere (n=24), sincere (n=24), and below sincere (n=48), and for Spectator we show
the total sample (n=96).
pothesis 3:
Result 3: A large majority of subjects in Stakeholder/E↵ort vote for the mechanism that
yields a higher payo↵ for them. Thus, most sincere subjects vote for the assortative matching
while most subjects at ranks 4 to 8 vote for the Boston mechanism.
Spectators favor the Boston mechanism and the assortative matching in similar propor-
tions. Note that only 16.7% abstain and save the voting costs. Overall, 45.8% of spectators
(55.0% of voters) vote for the Boston mechanism while 37.5% (45.0% of voters) vote for
the assortative matching. The hypothesis tests in Table 4 show that the voting pattern in
Spectator is significantly di↵erent from the “sincere” and “below sincere” students in treat-
ment Stakeholder/Random but there is only a marginally significant di↵erence to the subjects
ranked “above sincere.”
Since we varied which subjects are forced to be sincere, we can study the spectators’
reaction to this. In Figure 5, we show suggestive evidence that spectators are more likely to
vote for the assortative matching when sincere students have ranks 2 and 3 than when they
have lower ranks: In the treatment where sincere students have ranks 2 and 3, the share of
spectators voting for Boston is 37.5%, and thus 12.5 percentage points lower, compared to
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Table 4: Vote shares in Stakeholder/E↵ort and Spectator
Vote share H0: Vote shares equal to
Treatment Boston Assortative Abstention Spectator Above sincere Sincere
Spectator
Total 45.8% 37.5% 16.7%
Stakeholder/E↵ort
Above Sincere 20.8% 50.0% 29.2% p=0.062
Sincere 12.5% 79.2% 8.3% p=0.001 p=0.092
Below Sincere 89.6% 6.3% 4.2% p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000
Notes: This table shows the fraction of subjects who vote for the Boston mechanism, the assortative matching,
or abstain. For the Stakeholder/E↵ort treatment, we show separate vote shares for sincere students and
students whose ranks are above or below the sincere students. In the right panel, we show results from
hypothesis tests that compare the vote shares between the groups using Fisher’s exact tests.

















Notes: The figure shows the vote share for the respective procedure. “Total” comprises all subjects in the
Spectator treatment (n=96), whereas “Who is sincere” divides the sample into subgroups depending on who
is sincere (n=32 each).
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I find Boston more fair than
Assortative
In Assortative everyone receives
what she deserves
I prefer Assortative because no
one can make herself better off






Notes: The figure shows mean approval to each of the statements in Stakeholder/E↵ort and Spectator. The
scale ranges from 0 (fully disagree) to 4 (fully agree).
when sincere students have ranks 3 and 4, or 4 and 5. In contrast, when students have ranks
2 and 3, the proportion of them voting for the assortative matching is 50%, compared to
only 31% in the benchmark case. This suggests that the support for the Boston mechanism
interacts with who is hit by strategic choices of others, that is, whether the disadvantaged
students are ranked high or low. However, due to the low number of observations in the
corresponding cells, we do not have enough statistical power to estimate these treatment
di↵erences precisely.
To sum up, in the Spectator treatment where neither self-interest nor overconfidence can
play a role by design, a significant fraction of subjects favor the Boston mechanism. This
fraction is almost identical in size as the fraction of voters for the Boston mechanism behind
the veil of ignorance. Thus, we do not find support for Hypothesis 4.
Result 4: Almost half of the spectators vote for the Boston mechanism. A slightly smaller
proportion votes for the assortative matching, and around 16% abstain.
3.2.3 Reasons for voting decisions
Unlike in treatment Stakeholder/VoI, overconfidence cannot explain the spectators’ preference
for the Boston mechanism. In order to shed more light on why subjects vote for the Boston
mechanism, we turn to the responses in the post-experimental questionnaire.
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because no one can make
herself better off than her
actual rank
In Boston I expected a
higher payout
Above Sincere Sincere Below Sincere
Notes: The figure shows mean approval to each of the statements in the Stakeholder/E↵ort treatment. The
scale ranges from 0 (fully disagree) to 4 (fully agree).
Figure 6 displays the mean approval to statements regarding the mechanisms by treatment
and by voting decision. A clear pattern emerges: those who vote for a mechanism agree
more strongly to statements regarding their positive attributes than others. More strikingly,
this pattern is very similar in both treatments. Despite shutting down self-interest in the
Spectator treatment, the heterogeneity in fairness evaluations resembles the heterogeneity
among stakeholders. These results suggest that spectators who vote for the Boston mechanism
find the Boston mechanism fairer while the opposite is true for spectators who vote for the
assortative matching.
This interpretation is also supported by the motivations that spectators report in the
free-text part of the post-experimental questionnaire.12 For example, they state that they
voted for the Boston mechanism because “even with a bad result in the preceding test, a
smart approach to the second part can get you into a better school,” “it is fairer than letting
the allocation only depend on performance in the first part,” or “performance in the first part
depends on certain capabilities and some people find it easier than others.”
On the other hand, spectators vote for the assortative matching because “the allocation
is based on merit and those who deserve it have a 100% chance to get into the school they
deserve,” “because in the other mechanism two random students are disadvantaged,” or “when
subjects in lower ranks act strategically, Students 3 and 4 end up in School E, which I do not
consider fair.”
12All statements were translated from German.
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The last two columns of Figure 6 show that most subjects vote for the mechanism that
maximizes their payo↵. This emerges also from Figure 7 where we distinguish between sub-
jects in the role of students who profit or lose from the Boston mechanism. Subjects who
benefit from the Boston mechanism (“below sincere”) are more likely to find the Boston mech-
anism fairer than the assortative matching, they agree less to the statement that everyone
gets what they deserve in the assortative matching, and they do not agree that the assortative
outcome avoids that people can get more than they deserve according to their rank. Fairness
evaluations in the Stakeholder treatment are self-serving.
3.2.4 Results of Experiment 2: Preference lists and outcomes of Boston mech-
anism
The Boston mechanism was selected in ten sessions in the Stakeholder/Random treatment
and in six sessions in the Spectator treatment. The results are consistent with the findings
of Experiment 1 in that the vast majority of subjects understood the mechanism well and
exhibited equilibrium behavior. The shares of equilibrium behavior under the Boston mech-
anism are reported in Table A.2 in the appendix. Overall, in Stakeholder/Random 85.0% of
subjects choose the equilibrium strategy and 77.8% of subjects in the Player sessions. The
treatment di↵erence is not significant.
Next we consider the share of subjects who expect others to submit a first choice that is
consistent with equilibrium behavior. As in Experiment 1, by far the majority of subjects
expect other subjects to rank the school first which is prescribed by the equilibrium strategy,
see Table A.3 in the appendix.
4 Conclusions
Both studies show that stakeholders vote in line with their self-interest. This is true inde-
pendently of whether the subjects’ ranks (or priority at schools) are determined randomly or
with a real-e↵ort task. This supports the work by Pathak and So¨nmez (2008) who assume
that strategically sophisticated parents support the Boston mechanism.
In the first study with random ranks, the majority of subjects, who do not know what
their rank will be, prefer the Boston mechanism. Since ranks are determined randomly, the
Boston mechanism and the assortative matching have the same distribution of payo↵s ex
ante. Nevertheless, many subjects are willing to give up a fraction of their payo↵ to vote for
the Boston mechanism.
In the second study, the ranks are based on a real-e↵ort task. Spectators, who decide
on which mechanism is implemented in a future session, have split preferences between the
assortative matching and the Boston mechanism. Thus, the proportion of votes for the
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Boston mechanism decreases but it is still sizable. In a post-experimental questionnaire, the
spectators state that playing the game well justifies higher payo↵s.
The experiment identifies a novel reason for the frequent use of the Boston mechanism.
In spite of the presence of sincere students who are harmed by the Boston mechanism, the
majority of subjects behind a veil of ignorance and of spectators display a preference for
the Boston mechanism over the assortative matching. A significant share of individuals make
choices consistent with the idea that an environment in which one has to to be fair. Given the
often voiced concern that strategically complex mechanisms increase inequality and therefore
tend to be unfair, this finding is surprising; it suggests that fairness preferences over matching
mechanisms are more complex than typically assumed. Future research needs to assess the
importance of procedural preferences over matching mechanisms for real-world applications.
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A Additional Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics
Stakeholder/ Stakeholder/ Stakeholder/
Random VoI E↵ort Spectator Player
Age (Mean) 23.708 22.854 23.094 22.802 22.646
(3.854) (4.946) (4.496) (3.272) (3.836)
Female (Share) 0.521 0.604 0.552 0.500 0.500
Studying (Share) 0.948 0.917 0.927 0.958 0.969
Observations 96 48 96 96 96
Notes: Table shows descriptive statistics of the experimental dataset. Standard deviations for continuous
variables are in parentheses.
Table A.2: Equilibrium choices in Stakeholder/E↵ort and Player (Experiment 2)
Rank Stakeholder/E↵ort Player Fisher’s exact test
Above Sincere 18/20 (90.0%) 10/11 (90.9%) p=1.000
Below Sincere 33/40 (82.5%) 18/25 (72.0%) p=0.363
Total 51/60 (85.0%) 28/36 (77.8%) p=0.415
Notes: Table shows the fraction of subjects who play the equilibrium strategy in the Boston mechanism by
treatment. Best response depends partly on who are the sincere students. In all cases, students in rank 1 list
school A first and students in ranks 7 and 8 list school C first, second or third. With students in ranks 2 and
3 being sincere, students in rank 4 list school B first, while students in ranks 5 and 6 list school C first. With
students in ranks 3 and 4 being sincere, students in rank 2 list school B first while students in ranks 5 and 6
list school C first. With students in ranks 4 and 5 being sincere, students in rank 2 list school B first while
students in ranks 3 and 6 list school C first.
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Table A.3: Expectations of other subjects’ equilibrium choices (Experiment 2)
Rank Stakeholder/E↵ort Player Fisher’s exact test
Above Sincere (Rank 1) 62/70 (88.6%) 37/42 (88.1%) p=1.000
Above Sincere (Rank 2) 40/49 (81.6%) 19/21 (90.5%) p=0.485
Above Sincere (Rank 3) 13/21 (61.2%) 12/14 (85.7%) p=0.252
Below Sincere (Rank 4) 16/21 (76.2%) 18/21 (85.7%) p=0.697
Below Sincere (Rank 5) 34/49 (69.4%) 21/28 (75.0%) p=0.794
Below Sincere (Rank 6) 52/70 (74.3%) 28/42 (66.7%) p=0.397
Notes: This table shows the reported expectations about other subjects’ equilibrium behavior regarding their
first choice. The equilibrium strategy depends partly on who is sincere. In all cases, students in rank 1 list
school A first and in rank 6 list school C first. With students in ranks 2 and 3 being sincere, students in rank
4 list school B first, while students in ranks 5 list school C first. With students in ranks 3 and 4 being sincere,
students in rank 2 list school B first, while students in ranks 5 list school C first. With students in ranks 4 and
5 sincere, students in rank 2 list school B first, while students in rank 3 list school C first. Note that students




Figure B.1: Screenshot of Trial Period
Notes: The screenshot displays the trial period of student 3, who is in a group where student 3 and 4 have to
submit their true preferences. Subjects have five minutes to try out di↵erent rank-order lists for non-sincere
students. When clicking the button the resulting matching is shown.
26
Figure B.2: Screenshot of Real E↵ort Task
Notes: The screenshot displays the real e↵ort task in the Stakeholder/E↵ort and Spectator treatment. Subjects
are supposed to count the number of zeros in the table on the left. After submitting the counted number a
new table is generated. The red button at the bottom of the screen opens a web browser, in which subjects
can browse the internet.
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